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Introduction
The F-100 was a very simple airplane. It 
Problem of Technology
The United States Air Force (USAF) long ago retired the F-100s to the boneyard to make way for today's complex fighter aircraft like the F-16. Recently, rapid increases in computing power corresponding to Moore's Law translated into an almost over night exponential leap in the F-16's hardware and software complexity. 2 While most see the benefit to these rapid advances as enhanced combat power, the underlying challenge is to keep pace training the "man in the machine". Multiple current day constraints prevent meeting this challenge through a simple increase of flying hours. Rather, today's fighter community must leverage emerging simulation technology into combined flight training to counter mission employment complexity created by technology itself. Gen Hawley's remarks were a precursor to championing one such leveraged
solution-utilizing high-tech simulators called Distributed Mission Trainers (DMT).
The USAF is currently proliferating hi-tech simulators in the F-16, F-15, E-3 and E-8 communities. Interconnectivity or networking of two or more of these stand-alone simulators creates a Mission Training Center (MTC), which when further networked create Distributed Mission Operations (DMO). Ultimately, the grand operational vision of DMO is to interconnect non-collocated users creating a "virtual" joint training environment across multiple platforms and disciplines. However, while the fully implemented long term vision is years away, the nearterm benefit of leveraging these high-tech simulators to close the growing gaps in flying training is real. Justification for DMO funding in some regard stems from continuing research that postulates "simulation, when properly applied and combined with flying training, can reduce the distance between the Continuation Training (CT) ramp and the proficiencies required in combat" (see Figure 1 for detail). 3 Continuation Training is merely how we train for combat during peacetime and safety constraints create gaps in CT. The fighter aviation community also encountered other training gaps in the past decade. These stemmed from a systematic reduction in the average pilot's flying hours coincident with massive increases in aviation technology. 4 This increase in aviation technology brought the F-16 from its early beginnings in 1973 as a "day VFR" fighter to the multi-role, multi-sensor and multi-weapons platform today. 5 The USAF added significant capabilities to the F-16 in the way of LANTIRN, HTS and AMRAAM during and post OPERATION Desert Storm. These capabilities required the addition of qualification training tasks, some of which were executed in simulators. Again in the past two years, the F-16 community realized a quantum leap in software and hardware technology under the Common Configuration Implementation Program (CCIP). Unfortunately, the resulting exponential jump in complexity on a single platform adds to the growing training dilemma and gap. The bottom line is that no matter how complicated the aircraft and its associated avionics become, all of the technological advances are useless without pilots having the available training to master new systems and their mission employment. The MTCs or DMO being emplaced likely provide the best means to bridge the gap, enabling the "virtual" simulation world to train inexperienced pilots into combat ready fighter pilots with superior operational awareness. Taken from the analysis, Figure 1 illustrates that the available CT in a given fighter unit falls well short of achieving the required combat MEC proficiency. Safety is one of the key drivers, but there are others. The old adage of "train like you fight" only goes as far as safety permits. Live ordnance training is limited to featureless targets and the chance for any actual airto-air weapons employment is infrequent at best. A general inability to train against "red" opposition ground or air threat simulators further limits the ability to train in an environment that replicates the conditions of combat. These limitations compound existing safety and resource constraints. Air combat training is becoming increasingly constrained by shrinking budgets, airspace limitations for countermeasures and supersonic employment, and operational taskings that limit CT opportunities. Therefore, this myriad of constraints and restraints further hamstrings the peacetime MEC training gap driven in large part by concerns for personnel, equipment and environmental safety. Finally, as if the challenge were not big enough, recent and rapid technology changes exacerbated the problem, especially for the F-16 community.
Technology Created Gap by the F-16 Evolution
Rarely do you hear of a USAF leader asserting that technology hampers combat employment. Quite the contrary, most state that technology enabled combat aviation to progress rather rapidly over the past century. However, rapid advances in an airframe's hardware and software create a corresponding training gap until the pilot learns the new systems' employment.
Since the introduction of the Block 40 F-16 in 1988, the F-16 transitioned from its original "day-VFR" fighter design to an all-weather, night capable combat platform. During the early 1990's multiple airframe upgrades occurred, corresponding to the addition of LANTIRN, HTS and AMRAAM capabilities. These additions created training challenges and specialized training programs followed. However, operational units in large part shouldered this burden by increased Mission Qualification Training (MQT) and tailored CT upgrade programs. Over time, the inclusion of this training into the F-16's Initial Qualification Training (IQT) and follow-on specific Block 40 or 50 courses taught at Luke AFB lessened the operational unit's burden.
CCIP for the F-16 community again complicates training and creates a technology driven training gap. Figure 2 highlights the widened gap created, which all Block 50 units face.
Unfortunately, the operational units will bear the burden for this additional training for some time. There is no current plan to execute the IQT syllabus in Block 50 CCIP airframes and the first of the CCIP aircraft, albeit Block 42 models at Luke AFB, do not arrive until late 2005. The recent declining trends should again peak concern.
However, the declining trend did not occur in a vacuum and several other factors are critical.
Ops Tempo/Manning/Maintenance Induced Reduction
Three other critical areas presented challenges to fighter sorties over the past decade. All are likely to remain problematic today and the PACAF brief from '99 highlighted all three. Ops tempo supporting Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) rotations to ON/SW previously impacted efforts to provide adequate continuation training. Any prediction of continued AEF rotations matching those of ON/SW is uncertain, but deployments to support the GWOT likely will continue for some time. PACAF estimated that 300 continuation sorties per squadron were lost for each rotation due to deployment/redeployment sorties, pilot swap-out and recovery periods, lack of quality training opportunities while deployed and limited opportunities for home station training due to split operations. 6 This is only one of the major factors. Multiple factors continue to plague the MC rate to include experienced enlisted technician manning shortages, spare part shortages, and most importantly the average age of the fighter fleet tripling from 6 to 18 years since 1990.
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The third factor is the numeric composition of fighter squadrons or the numbers of primary assigned aircraft (PAA). PAA drives an organization's ability to produce sorties from a maintenance perspective and schedule sorties from the operations side. Tactical Air Command and PACAF leadership realized this between '78 and '84 when they stopped rapidly declining MC rates by consolidating 18 PAA squadrons into 24 PAA squadrons. However, the recent post
Cold War falling MC rates appear to correlate to a leadership decision to reverse these actions.
Converting 27 of the 38, 24 PAA squadrons back to 18 PAA squadrons had decisive, yet undesirable effects.
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Significant ops/maintenance manning and airframe availability issues compounded the negative effect on sortie generation. This factor alone is worthy of additional research, but beyond this scope. These factors combined with other training gaps should provide a clear picture of the "Total Gap" depicted by Figure 2 for deficient combat proficiency training.
Shift in Flying Hour Training $$ to DMO
The multi-faceted picture painted by this historical background illuminates the challenge at hand. The challenge is to recognize the "real" current problem In the era of scrutinized budgets due to wartime considerations, something must unfortunately give and that something is O&M dollars.
Prior to FY 04, a good portion of the funding for the development of DMTs, to MTCs and finally to the DMO concept rested within the Air Force Research Lab (AFRL) and test community. This changed last year, as funding for the DMO required a large capital investment.
According to ACC/DOTO and DOTB, the Air Staff mandated a 5% across the board reduction in O&M FHP dollars to provide some capital. 12 With the limited number of operational MTC facilities, no true evaluation measure exits to determine whether or not these hours are truly being "replaced" by DMO hours. For those who cringed at Gen Hawley's suggestion to replace 30% of proficiency training with simulators, the day has arrived. That math is derived from the 25% reduction in the average monthly sortie rate (12 to 9) over the last decade, coupled with last year's 5% additional reduction in the FHP. With all factors considered, it is now time for the "replacing", because up to this point just a 30% gap in combat training capability exists.
Seemingly undaunted by the reductions, the USAF must continue to train and remains committed to the ultimate DMO vision. Recent comments from the USAF Chief of Staff at a DMO update brief reiterated this commitment, "DMO will be fully funded". 13 Currently, there is no indication of the resultant impact this statement will have. However, underscore that with yet another Air Staff directed 2% across the board reduction in O&M FHP dollars for '06 and '07 to offset costs incurred by the GWOT. 14 Given all these realities, the challenge remains to bridge the gap in combat proficiency training. Based on the depicted picture, the only realistic solution is to leverage high-tech simulation in the combat training environment. By no means is this the first time in aviation history that aviators relied on simulation for training assistance. 
Why Simulation Historical Beginnings and the Evolution of Realism
Simulation is no new concept to aviation training or to the USAF. Flight simulation saw its early beginnings with the Wright Flyer, and as evidenced by DMO, kept a steady pace of improvement and technological advancement right along with those of the modern aircraft.
Throughout the history of simulation, two key elements played a significant role in the direction of development and acceptance by aviators. First is realism and the second is training effectiveness (or transfer of training). Both are required for aviator acceptance as substitutes for "real-time" in the aircraft and the gap to close already stands at 30% flying time lost.
Even in the early days of simulation, realism of the model, at least its dimension and appearance, was a primary concern. Arguably, some of the first simulators were wooden barrels mocked up to be horses and ridden by soldiers of the cavalry to practice mounted riding and fighting. Flying simulation began along with the Wright brothers' first flight. They built a mock up of the Wright Flyer without canvas coverings to practice the basic taxiing and flight control drills. However, realism soon took less of a literal design approach in the era of Edwin Link. The military used simulation from its inception in training crews for combat, but has maintained a more neutral stance than civil aviation for the credit given to simulated flight training. Following WWII, the USAF used simulators to rehearse strategic combat missions. Realism continued to drive simulation and its corresponding training value.
Technological advances in computing power, visual, and motion systems allowed the entire aviation community to overcome many hurdles in training and to maintain both basic and complex task proficiency. Simulation excels in training to non-permissive tasks such as emergency procedures or combat tasks unexecutable in the air due to peacetime constraints. Specific accreditation of the simulator is required and a corresponding effective transfer of training must be demonstrated before exploring the credit for "permissive live fly" events.
Requirements for Effective Training Transfer
The USAF accreditation standard for DMO and the corresponding MTCs is currently under review, so a detailed discussion is not provided. 9 However, the basic principles of transfer of training (TOT) research are relevant as training programs evolve to augment flying proficiency requirements. "TOT is the ability for a skilled behavior which has been learned in one situation to be carried over to another," and is then measured by a Training Effectiveness Ratio (TER). 10 One such definition given to TER is expressed by the transfer of training in terms of the training time saved in the air through simulation. The formula used is TER=A-A S /S, where A= aircraft training time when not using a simulator, A S = aircraft training time when using a simulator, and S= simulator training time. 11 To achieve a TER value of +1.0, the amount of training time saved in the air equals the amount of time spent in the simulator. Values above and below +1.0 correspond to an equivalent ratio between the time spent in the simulator and time saved in the air. However, this comparison requires another important caveat.
"TOT studies do not compare simulator training to flight training; they make no attempt to prove that simulation is better than in-flight training". 12 However, if a TER value indicates a positive number approaching +1.0 or better, then the noted positive transfer may infer that the "use of the simulator can reduce the dependence upon operational aircraft during training by influencing the learning of tasks that must be performed in those aircraft". 13 Aviation describes in depth. The four primary concepts are cues, discrimination, generalizations, and mediators. These concepts form a basis for evaluation criteria, both subjective and objective when observing training transfer from a simulation device to task proficiency.
Few past studies allowed researchers accurately measurements of TOT for complex combat tasks. Studies from the 1950's to the mid-80s generally focused efforts on basic pilot tasks such as take-off and landing. Although some trends exhibited a positive correlation, little was concluded about complex high-level tasks. 15 The AFRL conducted a further review into sixty-seven studies during the period from 1986 to 1997 and found only 13 directly related to the TOT. 16 Again, most of these studies centered on basic skills. Several studies examined the impacts on bombing accuracy and instrument flying. Both cases revealed positive trends in providing an effective transfer of skills. 17 Unfortunately, specific studies yielding reliable or conclusive results into a simulator's TOT applied to complex combat mission tasks are all but non-existent. This holds especially true for multi-ship simulation over the past twenty years.
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Even though specific empirical data driven TOT studies are elusive, several previous and on-going efforts provide positive insight. The few available and published studies center on training accomplished in the SAAC or in the F-15 McDonnell Aircraft Simulation facility. Two AFRL studies (1977, 1980) using the SAAC demonstrated small transfer effects for specific airto-air combat competencies and subordinate tasks. 19 More importantly, an evaluation of the SAAC in 1976 discovered how paramount a pilot's use of visual cues is to accomplishing air-toair tasks. Visual cues for these tasks provide essential information for positional relationship, own-ship attitude and performance in relationship to adversary aircraft and terrain. 20 This visual information is not generally derivable from other cockpit sources. Therefore, a key link from SAAC to DMO is the 360-degree wrap-around field of view. Visual cues are crucial in providing appropriate discrimination of surrounding events in the complex mission arena.
Appropriate discrimination in the simulated environment permits generalization to carry over to the aircraft via the mediator of repetition in hi-fidelity simulation. While visual cues are one piece of the puzzle, the studies at the McDonnell facility point to another key factor. 
Acceptance and Accreditation
Whether attempting to execute the training of basic or complex tasks through simulation, pilot acceptance and accreditation always play significant roles. Pilot opinion drove much of the current design for advanced simulation training. Accreditation of F-16's simulators was pivotal to the evolution of increasingly advanced visual systems. Concurrency with the many technological advances drove this continued need. In the late 80's, the USAF looked to replace their Weapons System Trainers due to underutilization and annual cost. 23 The replacements varied from a small desktop Air Intercept Trainer to the Multi-Task Trainer (MTT).
The replacements all were characterized by limited screen visual displays. The MTT's design concept was to provide "CT/refresher training in selected emergency procedures, basic instrument flight, and air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons system employment". 24 The MTT eventually evolved to the Unit Training Device (UTD) utilized by the Block 40 community and an additional Weapons Task Trainer (WTT) utilized by the Block 50 community. Both systems arguably filled the task at hand of training basic proficiency tasks, but nothing complex or tactical. Common pilot remarks about the systems focused on their inadequacy to provide accurate visual cues and the inability to network multiple devices. 25 These devices continually lagged the software and hardware updates in the aircraft. These lapses created unwanted negative opinion on simulation's effectiveness and concurrency became a key issue.
Concurrency is central to device accreditation as described in Air Force Instructions
(AFI) 36-2251 and 36-2248. 26 The rapid aviation technological advances over the last decade and specifically CCIP complicated this requirement. In Block 50 units, the WTT continued to lag the software and hardware modifications. For example, the WTT at the USAF F-16
Weapons School (F-16 WIC) was finally upgraded to the first software version of CCIP (M2.3) months after the last aircraft was modified. This level of difference between aircraft and simulator is a bit beyond what most consider negative "sim-isms" and does not facilitate a great deal of positive TOT. In this case, training students to basic SEAD tasks is somewhat futile as one continually remarks, "don't pay attention to the monochrome green displays and symbologyit will ALL be different in the jet tomorrow". 27 With the decline in pilot sorties, this approach is not the right answer and thankfully, MTCs are being proliferated at Block 50 units.
Concurrency, realism, and TOT all appear favorable for the advanced visual systems and networking capability of the MTCs. The DMO roadmap identifies how MTC accreditation will ensure the system simulates the desired combat environment and interactions. Specifically evaluated are "the quality of the visual cues, accuracy of the sensor presentations, environmental factors, validity of threat models, fidelity of the cockpit, and overall hardware/software capabilities". 28 Concurrent with accreditation, ACC tasked AFRL to continue to investigate DMO effectiveness in the transfer of Ready Aircrew Program (RAP) training elements and the amount of credit given for this environment's experience. 29 Directly tied to this research are ACC's studies into the MECs appropriate for training applicability in the DMO environment.
ACC previously completed MEC analysis for the F-15/E-3 and recently finished establishing the baseline F-16 MECs in both air-to-air and air-to-ground arenas. 30 The MEC analysis should help to bridge the existing gap between the current "soft" subjective advanced simulation TOT effectiveness studies to more concrete metric driven empirical methods. The
Training Task List (TTL) associated with baseline single ship simulation of the past derives some of these baseline metrics. These more fundamental tasks focused on a pilot's ability to "learn the basics of the weapons system…learn which button does what, but [not to] learn essence of [the fighter] business, which is team combat". 31 The MTC provides the venue for team, as well as single ship combat proficiency training. Even though the MECs are defined in general operational terms, subject matter experts demanded that they be specific and relevant. 32 This allows for a link between lower level TTLs and higher-level MEC objectives, providing the metrics for TOT data. Figure 3 illustrates the direct link from TTL to MEC.
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Training Task "Such data take considerable time and effort to collect, and there are major issues associated with developing appropriate methods and measurements to assess performance in flight". 2 However, the study revealed significant results after just a week of training for the knowledge acquisition of less experienced pilots in air-to-air combat concepts. In effect, the data showed the mental models of inexperienced pilots aligned more closely to experienced pilots after receiving the training. 3 This data is promising if similar results are attained by focused training to bridge the knowledge gaps for inexperienced pilots left by declining sorties and technological advances.
Another study attempted to find a correlation between the 16 th WS DMO training and a student's success rate during follow-on live fly Air Combat Tactics (ACT) syllabus sorties. The study examined pass/fail rates for seven 16 th WS classes from 2000 to 2003. Four of these classes did not have the DMO training as part of the syllabus. The statistical results were inconclusive in demonstrating enhanced student performance from DMO training, but "subjectively and financially it [DMO] appeared beneficial". 4 The subjective nature centered on favorable student and instructor comments concerning mission rehearsal and repetition.
Few voice arguments about the repetition and intrinsic ability to increase proficiency on basic tasks such as radar/shot mechanics and communications. An AFRL "White Paper" noted:
"During 5 days of DMT training at AFRL (Class 03B), WIC [16 th WS] students flew 236 engagements, spent 7.5 hours of time "flying", 17.5 hours in debriefings, with ZERO dollars spent in maintenance, fuel costs and red air support. Back at Nellis, those numbers would be reduced to 75 engagements (a 66% reduction) assuming a 10 turn 10, 3 engagements per mission, with at least 6 adversaries every go, and ZERO losses due to weather, MX, etc." 5 Pure repetition of any task provides proficiency benefit assuming no negative transfer occurs.
Unfortunately, there is some negative transfer in the AFRL DMO. Concurrency in the simulators is an issue as they are configured as an F-16 Block 30 with minor differences in weapons employment and situational awareness displays. Sometimes limitations with visual displays also force pilots to fly "TAD (Tactical Awareness Display) visual", requiring them to fly focused "inside the cockpit". This trend subjectively appears to carry over periodically to live fly sorties back at Nellis with an over-reliance on data-link positional awareness displays. 6 These minor discrepancies aside, the DMO experience for the 16 th WS appears positive. Shaw is currently revising its training syllabus to include a greater number of MTC events to supplement live fly sorties. These simulator events are not replacing sorties. They provide an opportunity for basic skill enhancement prior to wasting JP-8 while an instructor coaxes a student through unfamiliar and complex display symbology. Shaw pilots will receive six MTC sorties in addition to twelve flights during their initial MQT program, three focused on basic skills at the TTL level and three at the combat MEC level. 9 One benefit Shaw currently has is the ability to use the Boeing contract instructors to conduct these simulator sessions. This leaves the "green suit instructors" free to conduct flight instruction or other squadron duties.
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MTC sorties are also integrated throughout the flight lead and instructor programs.
To begin bridging the safety limited CT gap, Shaw is leveraging the MTC again. In Feb '05, the wing pilots executed an Air-to-Air Turkey Shoot in the MTC. They are also conducting CT combat verification missions in the MTC, the equivalent of combat mission rehearsal. In preparation for DMO operations, they held a recent meeting with JSTARS and AWACS representatives to construct generic training scenarios. 11 While all of these efforts are on the leading edge of MTC integration, it demonstrates the beginning of an effective approach to 
Future Bridges to the Gap
Using the Virtual World to Train Inexperienced Pilots
Gadgets to Proficiency Commanders wish list. In this single airframe now resides the capability to execute most missions in counterland, counterair, and non-traditional intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance roles. With the emphasis placed on the "airframe", the question is whether the "man in the machine" is truly combat proficient at all these roles and missions? Further research is essential to provide an honest assessment of the average F-16 pilot's capability to absorb and retain the required proficiency training, before the resounding answer is yes.
Gaining Experience in "Safe" Environment
Safety is a key element of any simulator training. The capability for the instructor to hit the "freeze" or "crash over-ride" buttons is a life or death difference from live flight. DMO, however are not conducive to the "freeze" function due to the potential connectivity of a large amount of players. This would be akin to calling a "knock it off" in the middle of a large force exercise because you needed to get a learning point across to your wingman. However, the MTC environment or single ship simulation certainly provides this learning environment. This environment permits an on the spot discussion of a learning point and then a reset of the scenario. The experienced gained by rote repetition of any task is tough to dispute, assuming it is conducted in a device with the appropriate measures of realism and TOT accreditation.
Baseline arguments for DMO funding tout the safe environment that facilitates the conduct of MEC derived non-permissive combat tasks. Accurate weapons and threat modeling are paramount, but this environment permits real-time "kill removal" of both red and blue forces.
The action and resultant effect reinforces correct and proficient tactical execution. A warning for pilots is to remain conscience that this environment creates a tendency to "over or max perform" an airframe in order to bail out of a given threat scenario. Since these simulators do not replicate the physical forces placed on the body, these maneuvers could lead to a habit of performing a less than desirable maneuver during actual live flight when posed with a similar problem. However, several technological challenges exist before this becomes reality. Scenarios also would require close management to prevent live-constructive "virtual merges", but this is a small cost for the benefits reaped by enhanced CT. This combined training should permit the recapture of some previously lost combat proficiency training in RAP by a re-allocation of red air sorties.
Red Air Re-allocation
Notice the emphasis on re-allocation. This is not meant to be another way to "cut" flying hours, but rather an effort to regain some lost ground. The added benefit of flying some of your red air sorties from the simulator should go largely to the inexperienced pilots. This provides them yet another opportunity for immersion into the operation of complex avionics and gadgets in a safe environment. Any angle to leverage the MTC or DMO against the training gaps created over the last decade will not only justify the expense, but also get the CT ramp closer to training pilots to the ever-elusive goal of combat proficiency. Combat proficiency training for today's fighter pilot is an increasingly daunting task. As
Notes
Field Manual 100-5 alludes, this responsibility ultimately falls to the unit commander.
Commanders have a great new tool at their disposal with MTCs. Integrated training programs must be developed that maximize the training benefits permitted by hi-tech simulators. By no means should anyone be looking in the near term to replace additional flying hours with simulator hours. Rather, the approach needs to be one bent on recapturing the massive amount of continuation training lost over the last decade. Concurrently, the benefits of DMO can be leveraged in a manner to close the gap on the CT ramp towards combat MEC proficiency.
The continued initial success of DMO according to pilot opinion will only remain so with continued efforts to ensure realism, concurrency and transfer of training remain high. DMO truly can provide the leverage needed by the USAF to bridge the training gap created from a decade's worth of technological advancement, but hampered by massive reductions in sorties. 
